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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J O H N M. R A P P , dba R A P P
C O N S T R U C T I O N COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

{ Case No.
13552

S A L T L A K E C I T Y , a municipal
corporation; and M A R R I O T T
C O R P O R A T I O N , a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Brief of Defendant-Respondent
Salt Lake City

N A T U R E OF CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt
Lake County, granting Defendant-Respondent, Salt
Lake City, Summary Judgment and dismissing the
Complaint as to Defendant, Marriott Corporation. At
the hearing on the motion for Summary Judgment,
Respondent Salt Lake City contended that Appellant
1
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was barred from bringing his suit against Salt Lake
City by the doctrine of Governmental Immunity which,
under the facts of this case, has not been waived by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-1 et
seq., Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The lower Court granted Summary Judgment as
to Respondent Salt Lake City based upon its contention of governmental immunity at the hearing of the
motion and after memoranda were filed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 30, 1972, the City did enter
into a "Lease and Concession Agreement" with Airline
Foods, Inc., which is a subsidiary of Defendant Marriott
Corporation. Pursuant to the terms of said Agreement, real property located at the Salt Lake City International Airport was leased to Airline Foods for the
purpose of operating an in-flight catering kitchen upon
the demised premises. I t was agreed that Salt Lake
City was to construct "at its expense" a building or
buildings on the premises for use as an in-flight catering kitchen in accordance with plans and specifications
prepared by Airline Foods and approved by the Salt
Lake City Engineer. It was agreed that the City's expense was limited by the following provision:
"Lessor shall pay for the 'cost of the project'.
Provided that in the event the 'cost of the project'
2
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shall exceed the total sum of Five Hundred Fifty
Thousand ($550,000) Dollars, the Lessee shall
promptly pay Lessor upon demand the amount
by which the 'cost of the project' exceeds such
sum and which is the result of change orders and
other amendments and supplements to the construction contract or contracts issued or executed
by Lessor at the written request of and approved
by Lessee
"
On or about April 26, 1973, Salt Lake City mailed
to two contractor's associations, Associated General
Contractors of America, 1135 South West Temple
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Intermountain Contractors, P . O. Box 1829, Salt Lake City, Utah, a
Notice to Contractors requesting bids on the project.
(A copy of which is set out in full text in Appendix.)
On or about May 30, 1973, Salt Lake City caused the
said Notice to Contractors to be published in the Deseret News, a newspaper of general circulation in Salt
Lake City. (A copy of said notice is set out in full text
in Appendix.) No Notice of Invitation for Bids was
sent to individual contractors and no individual contractor was requested to submit a bid, contrary to what
is implied in Appellant's Brief under "Statement of the
Facts" on page three. In response to the Invitation for
Bids, three bids were received, i.e., Bodell Construction
Company in the amount of $718,114.00, Rapp Construction Company (Appellant), in the amount of
$648,888.00 and J.J.G. Construction Company, (hereinafter referred to as "J.J.G.") in the amount of $540,000.000. The preliminary estimate made by the Salt
Lake City Engineer's Office was in the amount of
3
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$650,000.00. Following the opening of the bids on May
17, 1973, the low bid submitted by J.J.G. in the amount
of $540,000.00 was accepted by the Salt Lake City
Board of Commissioners.
The obligations of Airline Foods under said Lease
and Concession Agreement were guaranteed by Defendant Marriott Corporation and the said Agreement
did contain a provision that Marriott Corporation
would be permitted to bid on all or any portion of the
construction work. It is believed by Respondent, Salt
Lake City, that J.J.G. is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Defendant Marriott Corporation.
After the said Lease was approved by the Salt Lake
City Board of Commissioners, it was duly filed of
record with the Salt Lake City Recorder's Office, pursuant to Sec. 10-10-61, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended, which record was, as required by law, open
to the inspection of all interested persons.

POINT I
P L A I N T I F F ' S ACTION IS B A R R E D
BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it has
always been the law that no private action for tort will
lie against a municipality for an act or acts committed
while such municipality is performing a governmental
function. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 U. 573, 111
P.2d 800 (1941). See also: Davis v. Provo, 1 U.2d

i
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244, 265 P.2d 415 (1953) ; Cobia v. Roy City, 12 U.2d
375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961) ; and Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake
City, 13 U.2d 214,371 P.2d 211 (1962).
The right to institute an action is purely statutory
since it did not exist at common law and is strictly a
legislative function. As Justice Wolfe stated in his concurring opinion in the Niblock case:
"However, since the decision of this court has
steadfastly refused to so limit the doctrine, the
prevailing rule must continue to be the law until
the Legislature sees fit to change it." Niblock v.
Salt Lake, supra, at p. 805.
In 1965 the Utah Legislature saw fit to enact the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-1, et
seq., Utah Code Ann,, 1953, as amended, waiving governmental immunity in certain cases. However, only
in those cases specifically waived by the Act is a plaintiff allowed to bring a suit against a municipality. The
Act must clearly be applied to preserve sovereign immunity and waive it only as clearly expressed. Hope
v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 U.2d 4, 51lP.2d
1286 (1973).
Sec. 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended,
provides:
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this
act, all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit for any injury which may result from
the activities of said entities wherein said entity
is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a
governmental function."

5
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As to negligent acts of employees, Sec. 63-30-10,
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, provides for a
waiver of immunity, except in eleven specified cases,
two of which have application to the case at hand. The
first is: "[When the claim] arises out of the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is
abused, . . ." Sec. 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953,
as amended.
The funds for the construction of the in-flight
kitchen, subject of this suit, were obtained from the issuance of bonds which are to be paid from revenue derived from the Salt Lake City International Airport,
and, as such, are a "special fund" to be used for a special
purpose. Under the "Special Fund" doctrine, there is
no requirement that a contract for the construction of a
building be let through competitive bidding. See, Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 U. 203, 74 P.2d
1191 (1937). The statute requiring competitive bidding only requires such:
"Whenever the board of commissioners . . . of any
city . . . shall contemplate making any new improvement to be paid for out of the general funds
of the city, . . ." Sec. 10-7-20, Utah Code Ann.,
1953. (Emphasis added)
Therefore, the advertising for bids in this case was completely within the discretion of the City since it was not
obligated so to do by statute. Velasquez v. Union Pac.
BR., 24 U.2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970). The City has
the right, without the requirement, to make certain that

6
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it was obtaining the best price for the project. Hence,
the City was exercising a discretionary function and cannot be sued ''whether or not the discretion is abused."
See, Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 26 U.2d 78, 484 P.2d
1200 (1971).
The second and more compelling reason that suit
cannot be maintained in this instance is found in Subsection (6) which says that immunity from suit is not
waived if the injury "arises out of a misrepresentation
by said employee whether or not such is negligent or
intentional." Sec .63-30-10(6), Utah Code Ann., 1953,
as amended. As this Section clearly states, a suit cannot be maintained against a municipal corporation for
injury caused by misrepresentations made by its employees while performing a governmental function. See,
Boyce v. State of Utah, 26 U.2d 138, 486 P.2d 387
(1971). Misrepresentation is one of the basic elements
of Appellant's claim against Respondent, Salt Lake
City Corporation, as will be noted in Paragraphs 6 and
7 of Appellant's Complaint. For such misrepresentations, whether negligent or intentional, by commission
or omission, if any actually occurred, Appellant cannot maintain his action as it is barred by governmental
immunity.
That the action taken in this matter was a governmental function cannot be disputed. This Court has so
held in the case of Wade v. Salt Lake City, 10 U.2d
374, 353 P.2d 914 (1960). This Court held that the operation and the maintenance of an airport is performed
as a governmental function. Therein this Court held:
7
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"We are aware of the diversity of respectable
authority heading in almost all directions anent
interpretations of statutes dealing with airport
operation. The variegation ably is treated in 66
A.L.R. 2d 634. We prefer to conclude that our
statutes have spoken rather clearly and emphatically in favor of tagging the operation of airports
in this state by state political subdivisions under
statutory authority as being accomplished in a
governmental capacity, and until it is alleged and
justified as an operation either sanctioned by diffrent future legislation, the municipal airport at
Salt Lake City must be held to be operating
under such capacity." (Emphasis added) Wade
v. Salt Lake City, supra, at p. 915.
POINT II
T H I S A C T I O N I S B A S E D ON T O R T A N D
NOT UPON I M P L I E D CONTRACT.
In an attempt to circumvent governmental immunity, Appellant alleges some sort of a warranty
based upon some wildly concocted implied contract.
There can be no implied contract with Salt Lake City
for the following reasons:
1. T H E O N L Y M E T H O D O F C O N T R A C T I N G
I S B Y A C T I O N O F T H E B O A R D O F COMMISSIONERS AND MUST BE COUNTERS I G N E D BY T H E CITY RECORDER.
The general rule of law is that a municipality may
not be obligated on an implied contract. When employees of the City of Akron, Ohio, petitioned the
court for an award of overtime pay based upon implied
contract, the court held:
8
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"What the plaintiff is doing in this case is turning that promise into an implied promise to pay
in the event that he is unable to use all his accumulated overtime, but it has been held time and
again that the only manner in which a municipality may enter into a contract, agreement or obligation is by ordinance or resolution of its council. There can therefore be no contract, agreement or obligation against a municipality and
no implied liability. All liability ex contractu
must be expressed and be entered into by ordinance or resolution of the council." (Emphasis
added) Zehenni v. City of Akron, 19 Ohio Misc.
11,250N.E. 2d 630, 632 (1968).
This Court stated the same proposition thusly:
"Every person contracting with a municipal
corporation, or one who proposes to enter into a
contract with such corporation, is bound to take
notice of the provision of the city ordinances and
any limitations therein contained. In the case before us, while the plaintiff was misled into thinking that it had entered into a contract with the
defendant, it was nevertheless charged with
knowledge that the proposed contract was without binding effect until it was approved by the
governing body of the city." (Emphasis added)
Thatcher Chemical Company v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 21 U.2d 355, 445 P.2d 769, 771 (1968).
The ordinance which the Court referred to in the
Thatcher case and upon which is based its reason for so
holding was, in part:
". . . that no liability against Salt Lake City in
excess of one hundred fifty dollars shall be
created by the commissioner of any statutory de-

9
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partment without sanction of the board of commissioners first had and approved, . . . . Except
as herein provided, no person other than the board
of commissioners shall create any liability against
the city." Sec. 24-1-15, Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965.
This ordinance is still in effect; therefore, the only
method by which Salt Lake City can enter into a contract is by sanction of the Board of Commissioners.
A further provision of the Salt Lake City Revised
Ordinances requires:
"He [city recorder] shall countersign all contracts made in behalf of the city, and every contract made in behalf of the city or to which the
city is a party shall be void unless signed by the
recorder." (Emphasis added) Sec. 25-16-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965.
This section of the Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances
was enacted pursuant to the mandate of the Utah Legislature, Section 10-10-61, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended, which requires:
" H e [city recorder] shall countersign all contracts made on behalf of the city, and every contract made on behalf of the city or to which the
city is a party shall be void unless signed by the
recorder. H e shall maintain a record of all contracts, properly indexed, which record shall be
open to the inspection of all interested persons.9'
(Emphasis added).
It has been said that where there is a charter provision or a statute or ordinance prescribing the method
by which an officer or agent of a municipal corporation
10
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may bind the municipality by contract, that method must
be followed and there can be no implied contract or
implied liability of the municipality under such circumstance.
"Many cases hold that if a statute or the charter
requires certain express contracts of a municipality to be preceded by certain steps or to be made
in a certain way, and expressly or impliedly forbids the execution of such contracts in any other
way, then no implied contract can arise when the
expressed contract is invalid for failure to comply
with such statutory or charter provisions, nor
where, in the absence of an express contract, the
implied contract would have come within such
statute if it had been expressed. The fiction of
an implied promise or agreement, on the theory
of the liability based on quantum meruit, cannot
be substituted for an expressed contract which is
void for non-compliance with mandatory terms
of the statute or charter." 10 Mun. Corp., McQuillin, Sec. 29.112, p. 544.
A myriad of cases have stated this proposition,
only a few of which are quoted as follows:
"Where there is a statute or ordinance prescribing the method by which an officer or agent of
a municipal corporation may bind the municipality by contract, that method must be followed,
and there can be no implied contract or implied
liability of such municipality. Where the agents
of a city are restricted by law as to the methods
of contracting, the city cannot be bound otherwise
than by compliance with the conditions prescribed
for the exercise of power." (Emphasis added)
W acker-W abash Corp. v. City of Chicago, 350
111. App. 343, 112 N.E.2d 903, 908 (1953).
11
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The California Supreme Court said:
"The contract whose validity plaintiff seeks to
establish was not signed by the city manager as
the charter requires. I t could not have been
signed since the area to be included was never defined nor approved by the city attorney or the
council. I t is well settled that when a municipal
charter contains an express limitation upon the
mode in which the city may contract, the city is
bound only by contracts executed in accordance
with the charter provisions \ in other words, where
the statute provides the only mode by which the
power of the contract shall be exercised, the mode
is the measure of the power. (Cases cited) The
rule applies equally to contracts made by the city
in a governmental or proprietary function. (Cases
cited) When the charter provision has not been
complied with, the city may not be held liable in
quasi contract, and it will not be estopped to deny
the validity of the contract. (Cases cited)" (Emphasis added) Dynamic Industries Co. v. City of
Long Beach, 323 P.2d 768, 771 (1958).
In the case of Satroin v. City of Grand Forks, 159
Cal. App. 2d 294, 163 N . W . 2d 522 (1968), the court
stated, at p. 527:
"Where the statute expressly permits the City to
contract only upon the governing body's authorization, and further provides that a contract be
executed on the part of the City by its executive
officer and by the city auditor, no valid contract
exists where such statutory requirements have
not been complied with. . . . But where the statute expressly fixes certain requirements for execution of a contract, we do not believe municipal
officers can ignore such requirements and create
12
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an implied contract by their conduct since muni'
cipal contrcats must be executed in accordance
with statutory requirements"
(Emphasis added)
Courts have also held that this is the case even
though benefits are conferred upon the municipality by
completion of the contract.
" W h e r e a contract is made by a municipal corporation which is not warranted by the statutory
authority conferred upon it, the governing body
of the corporation has at all times the right to
treat the contract as void and refuse compliance
therewith. A reason frequently advanced in support of this rule is that since the powers of a
municipal corporation are wholly statutory,
every person who deals with such a body is bound
to know the extent of its authority and limitations
in its powers. I t is generally held that when a
contract has been entered into by a municipal
corporation with respect to a subject matter
which was not within its corporate powers, or
which it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations,
or in a prescribed mode or manner, the corporation cannot be held liable on the contract regardless of whether the other party thereto has fully
carried out its part of the agreement. The corporate powers of such a corporation cannot be
extended by the doctrine of estoppel. (Emphasis
added) Hoboken Local No. 2, etc. v. City of
Hoboken,
133 N . J . L . 334, U A.2d 329, 332
(1945).
" I t may sometimes seem a hardship upon a contractor that all compensation for work done, etc.,
should be denied him; but it should be remembered that he, no less than the officer of the corp13
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oration, when he deals in a matter expressly provided for in the charter, is bound to see to it that
the charter is complied with. If he neglects this,
or chooses to take the hazard, he is a mere volunteer, and suffers only what he ought to have anticipated." Dynamic Ind. Co. v. Long Beach,
supra, at p. 772.
It is generally accepted practice that a contractor submitting a bid is a mere volunteer and there is no anticipation on the part of the contractor that he will be paid
for his costs in preparing the bid if his bid is not accepted.
One mandatory requirement prescribed by the State
Legislature and carried out in the City Ordinances is
that all contracts must be countersigned by the City
Recorder in order for them to be valid. If this is not done
such contract is void.
"Countersignature of a municipal contract by a
particular officer is essential to its enforcement
where the statute requiring it is mandatory." 63
C.J.S. Mun. Corp. §1007 (c), p. 593.
As was stated in the Thatcher case, every person
contracting with the City is bound to take notice of the
provision that no contract can be entered into except be
it sanctioned by the Governing Body and countersigned
by the City Recorder. For this reason, no implied contract can be formed if it is for an amount exceeding one
hundred fifty dollars or if it is not countersigned by the
City Recorder. Even if such contract is formed, because
it is claimed that it was sanctioned by the Board of
Commissioners because of some action which they may
14
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have taken, then such contract is void for want of countersignature by the City Recorder.
2. T H E R E CAN B E NO I M P L I E D CONT R A C T B E C A U S E T H E R E W A S N O CONSIDERATION GIVEN.
It is a well settled rule that a contract must have
consideration and that in order to be binding each party
must give some legal consideration to the other by conferring the benefit upon him or suffering a legal detriment at his request. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 U.2d 433, 361
P.2dl77 (1961).
Salt Lake City did not give to Appellant: "Ten
Dollars and other good and valuable consideration." It
did not give One Dollar, not One Cent, nor did it give
even a peppercorn. All that was promised on the part
of Salt Lake City was that it would consider the bid of
Appellant. If " A " says to " B " : "If you will give me a
price at which you will sell your horse, I will consider
it." Do you have a binding contract? No! The promise
to consider the offer is not sufficient consideration.
Salt Lake City did not in any way obligate itself
by requesting bids. I t could reject all bids including
plaintiff's and J.J.G. Construction Company's (the
low bid and that bid which was accepted) if it so desired,
and it was so designated in the request for bids. (See
Notice to Contractors in Appendix). Salt Lake City
was not required to accept Plaintiff's bid even if it had
been the lowest responsible bid (which it was not). As
discussed under Point I, the funds from which the in15
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flight kitchen were to be constructed are special funds
and under the "Special Fund" doctrine there is no requirement to advertise for bids. Utah Power and Light
Co. v. Provo, supra. Therefore, no statute requires the
City to accept the lowest responsible bid. In the absence
of a statute requiring acceptance of "the lowest responsible bid," a municipality need not let to such bidder if it
merely adopts a policy of advertising for bids. Under
such conditions it may let to a higher bidder or to none
at all as it so desires. Lee v. City of Ames, 199 Iowa
1342, 203 N . W . 790 (1925) ; Archambault v. Mayor of
Lowell, 278 Mass. 327, 180 N . E . 157 (1932).
The court in the Archambault case stated, at p. 159:
"In the absence of the not unusual provision requiring contracts to be awarded the lowest responsible bidder such a requirement is not to be
implied, but it is to be inferred that the awarding
of the contracts is left to the reasonable judgment of the municipal officers charged with the
responsibility therefor. (Cases cited)."
The Lee case held, at p. 793:
"It is well settled that a municipal corporation
need not, in making its contracts, advertise for
bids and let to the lowest bidder in the absence of
an express statutory requirement, and where a
city is not required to advertise for bids, neither
is it required to let to the lowest bidder, in case it
does adopt such course. (20 Enc. of Law (2d
Ed.) 1165, and cases cited."
Herein lies part of the difference between the case
at hand and the case cited by Appellant, Heyer Products Co. v. U.S., (Ct. CI. 1956) 140 F . Supp. 409.
16
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In the Heyer case the government was required by statute to accept the bid "most advantageous to the government price and other factors considered." 41 U.S.
Code Ann., Sec. 152. I t was on the basis that Heyer's
bid was the "most advantageous to the government,"
that the court found some sort of an implied contract
which conferred upon the bidder certain rights. That
case was referred back to the trial court and when at
trial the trial court found Heyer's bid to be defective and
not "the most advantageous to the government," the
Court of Claims then held that Heyer was not entitled
to collect for his costs in preparing the bid. Heyer
Products Co., Inc. v. U.S., (Ct. of CI. 1959) 177 F .
Supp. 251. Hence, the consideration in the Heyer case
upon which the court based an implied contract was the
implied promise:
"However, we said that by the solicitation for
bids, the Government impliedly promised that it
would give honest and fair consideration to all
bids received and would not reject any one of
them arbitrarily or capriciously, but would award
the contract to that bidder whose bid in its honest
judgment was most advantageous to the Government." Heyer Products Co., Inc. v. U.S., supra,
at p. 252.
In the instant case there was no such obligation, no
implied promise to let the contract to the bidder whose
bid was most advantageous to the government nor to
the lowest responsible bidder, but any and all bids could
be rejected; hence, the only promise given was that the
bid would be considered and that is not sufficient consideration upon which to base an implied contract.
17
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POINT III
ADVERTISING FOR AND RECEIVING BIDS
C R E A T E S NO I M P L I E D C O N T R A C T A N D A
R E J E C T E D B I D D E R H A S NO STANDING.
It should be noted that Appellant cites several cases
stating that an unsuccessful bidder making a prima
facie showing of arbitrary or capricious consideration
of the bids by an agency will entitle such unsuccessful
bidder to a hearing. The following cases cited by Appellant can summarily be disposed of and disregarded
so far as standing in the case at bar is concerned: Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371,
424 F.2d 859 (1970); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Clafee,
147 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306 (1971); M.
Steinhal k Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 221,
455 F.2d 1298 (1971); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
Co. v. Driver, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 433 F.2d 1137
(1970); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 140 U.S. App.
D.C. 98, 28 L.Ed. 2d 234, 433 F.2d 1204 (1970), cert,
denied, 401 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1186 (1971); Simpson
Electric Co. v. Seamans, 317 F . Supp. 684 (D.D.C.
1970); Keco Ind. v. Laird, 318 F . Supp. 1361 (D.D.C.
1970); Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. U.S., 356 F .
Supp. 514 (D.C.E.D. Wash. 1973); Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. CI.
1971); and Curtiss-Wrgiht Corp. v. McLucas, 364 F .
Supp. 750 (D.C.N.J. 1973). The above cited cases have
no application in the case at hand because the decision
in each and every one of those cases was based upon the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. Section 500
18
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et seq., and the contractors in those cases were held to
have standing based upon the Judicial Review Section
of said Act, 5 U.S.C.A. Section 701 et seq. The specific
Section which applied in these cases was 5 U.S.C.A. Section 702, which reads as follows:
"A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or agrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial review thereof." Pub.L. 89-554. Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392.
For example, the Court stated this to be the case in
Scanwell Lab. and regarding standing said:
"They may not base decisions on arbitrary or
capricious abuses of discretion, however, and our
holding here is that one who makes a prima facie
showing alleging such action on the part of an
agency or contracting officer has standing to sue
under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act." Scanwell Lab. v. Shaffer, supra, at
p. 869.
The statement of Appellant on page 14 of his brief
to the effect that the case of Salt Lake City v. State,
22 U.2d 37, 448 P.2d 350 (1968), held that a municipality in Utah may be bound by an implied contract,
formed only from the conduct of the parties, is completely erroneous. In that case there had been an agreement entered into and such is stated in the facts of the
case.
". . . the city fathers entered into an agreement
with the leaders of the territorial government
which was subsequently reduced to writing in the
form of a series of documents including ordin19
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ances, statutes, and resolutions duly and regularly enacted and passed." (Emphasis added) at
p. 351.
I t should further be noted that the Court states
that the series of documents including ordinances,
statutes and resolutions were duly and regularly enacted
and passed. This writer would assume that what the
Court said was that all formalities had been complied
with. In fact the opinion sets out the agreement made
and entered into as of the 25th day of October, A.D.
1926 by and between Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation of Utah, and the State of Utah, which contract
was "duly executed". See, Salt Lake City v. State,
supra, at p. 353.
Therefore, Appellant's implication that the contract was not countersigned by the City Recorder is also
erroneous. The acts referred to by the Court when it
stated:
"The actual agreements reached by and between
the two bodies politic must be determined from
a consideration of all the documents available, together with the understanding of the parties as
manifest by what was done in connection therewith." (Emphasis added) Salt Lake City v.
State, supra, at p 355,
were the enacting of ordinances, statutes and resolutions
and not actions which would create an implied contract,
but a written contract which completely complied with
all statutory requirements.
This leaves Appellant with only one case (the
Heyer Produtcs case) in support of his contention that
20
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he has standing by virtue of an implied contract. This
is the only case that this writer could find (and evidently
the only one which Appellant could find) which holds
that a bidder who is unsuccessful has obtained an implied contract. As a matter of fact, only one out of four
Judges in that case found the basis for standing to be
an implied contract. Two Justices dissented in part and
held that the Plaintiff in that case had standing based
upon the fact that it was a claim founded upon an Act
of Congress, but not upon the basis of an implied contract. One Judge in dissenting in total stated:
"If the officer acting on behalf of the Government was guilty of the acts alleged in the petition, it would amount to fraud. A suit founded
on fraud would sound in tort, and it is clear that
this court has no jurisdiction of tort actions.
Martilla v. United States, 118 Ct. CI. 177. The
plaintiff, in order to recover, must show that he
has a contract that he shall receive fair consideration of his bid, or that a statute by its own
terms authorizes his recovery in the event his bid
does not receive fair consideration. Neither the
facts nor the statutes involved justify a conclusion that the Government made a contract with
plaintiff to give him fair consideration. On the
other hand, there is nothing in the statute which,
by its own terms, would authorize the plaintiff
to recover a judgment if the contracting officials
had not given his bid fair consideration. Without
one or the other basis, I cannot see how the court
can render judgment for the plaintiff." Heyer
Products Co. v. U.S., supra, at p. 414.
Thus, it leaves Appellant with one Judge from the
Court of Claims (not a very pursuasive authority) to
21
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support his contention. The great weight of authority,
in fact all authority found by this writer, except the
Heyer case, is contrary. The case of Edelman v. Fed.
Housing Admin., 382 F.2d 594 (1967), is a good example and expressly holds contrary to the Heyer Products case and is a much better reasoned opinion. Therein the Court stated:
"Appellant seeks to avoid the statutory policy of
governmental immunity clearly established in the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680, by
several arguments directed toward excluding the
facts of this case from the operation of the Act.
None of these claims can be accepted . . . (among
these contentions) . . . Appellant contends that
by advertising for bids, F H A obligated itself to
give fair consideration to all bids, and that by
allegedly favoring Tally's bid it did not give
fair consideration to appellant's bid. In doing
this, argues appellant, F H A breached an implied contract with appellant entitling appellant
to damages measured by his expense in preparing
and submitting his bid. (See Heyer Products Co.
v. United States, supra) The District Court,
disagreeing with the Court of Claims decision in
Heyer Products Co. v. United States, supra,
held that this claim also sounded in tort. W e do
not find it necessary to reach this question. I t is
apparent that if appellant were permitted to
prove a breach of an implied contract of fair consideration by showing that the entire auction was
a sham, the effect would be to permit an unsuccessful bidder to attach the auction on the grounds
of fraud and mispresentation—a suit which, as we
have pointed out, is doubly barred/' (Emphasis
added) Edelman v. Fed. Housing Admin, supra,
at p. 597.
22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court also said:
"[IJt is well established that an unsuccessful
bidder has no standing in a suit to challenge the
legality of the bidding procedure. . . . Bidding
procedures are for the benefit of the public generally and confer no private right on the bidder.
I t avails appellant nothing to assert that he is
not an unsuccessful bidder because Tally's bid
was void; this is the issue which he is barred from
litigating. . . . The appellant never entered into
a contract with the F H A . The invitation to bid
specifically reserves to the FHA the absolute
right to decline to enter into a contract with any
bidder. Regardless of whether or not Tally's bid
was valid, there was no contract of sale with appellant because the F H A never accepted appellant's bid." (Emphasis added) Edelman v. Fed.
Housing Admin., supra, at p. 597.
In stating that any contract theory to the effect that
bidding and all aspects of the sale would fairly be
conducted, the Court stated:
"Furthermore, in order to recover on a contract
theory, appellant would have to prove an implied
contract with the F H A to the effect that the
agency would fairly conduct all aspects of the
auction, including guaranteeing to each prospective bidder, equal access to all relevant information. It can hardly be contended on the facts of
this case (which facts were very similar to the
case at hand) that the F H A entered into such a
broad contract. What appellant seeks is judicial
review of an allegedly improper sale by the FHA
and there is no question that the courts do not
possess that power. Gart v. Cole, 166 F . Supp.
129 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'd. 263 F.2d 244 (2 Cir.
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1958) ; Choy v. Faragut Gardens 1, Inc., 131 F .
Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). I t follows that the
complaint was properly dismissed." (Emphasis
added) Edelman v. Fed. Housing Admin., supra,
at p. 597, 598.
Other cases citing Edelman and holding to the same
effect are:
Jones v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 334 F .
Supp. 739 (1971) at p. 744; I-Ridge Lumber
Co. v. U.S., 443 F.2d 452 (1971) at p. 456;
Gary Aircraft Corp. v. U.S., 342 F . Supp. 473
(1972) at p. 477.
Even if the Heyer Products case were pursuasive
authority, it does not give any comfort to the Appellant
in the case at hand. The implied contract which the
Court held was created by the acts of the parties was
only to the effect:
" I t was an implied condition of the request for
offers that each of them would be honestly considered, and that the offer which in the honest
opinion of the contracting officer was the most
advantageous to the Government would be accepted." Heyer Products Co. v. U.S., supra, at
p. 412.
''Among these rights is the right to have its bid
honestly considered. The Government is under
the obligation to honestly consider it and not to
wantonly disregard it. If this obligation is
breached and plaintiff is put to needless expense
in preparing its bid, it is entitled to recover such
expense." (Emphasis added) Heyer Products
Co. v. U.S., supra, at p. 413.
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The only obligation which the Court found in the
Heyer Products case was that the bid be honestly and
fairly considered, that it would not be wantonly disregarded and that if it was the bid which was the most
advantageous to the Government, it would be accepted.
After the case was referred back to the Trial Court and
judgment was given to the Government, the case was
again appealed and in that appeal the Court stated:
"So the question before us is, was the plaintiff's
bid rejected in good faith or arbitrarily or capriciously? If its rejection was not fraudulent nor
arbitrary nor capricious nor so unreasonable as
to necessarily imply bad faith, plaintiff has established no right to recovery." Heyer Products Co.
V. U.S., 177 F . Supp. 251 (1959), at p. 252.
The question then was whether the plaintiff's bid was
the most advantageous to the government or not, and if
not there was no breach of warranty under the implied
contract. The Trial Court found that Heyer Products
Co. bid was defective and was not the most advantageous
to the Government, therefore, the Court of Claims held:
"We cannot say that OTAC did not act in good
faith in deciding that Weidenhoff's bid was the
one most advantageous to the Government. Certainly we cannot say that the rejection of plaintiff's bid was arbitrary or capricious or lacking
in good faith.
It results that plaintiff's petition must be dismissed." Heyer Products Co., Inc. v. U.S., supra,
at p. 257.
Salt Lake City certainly did give fair consideration to
all bids which were received and accepted that bid which
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was most advantageous to the City and the taxpayers
thereof. Appellant does not contend that the lowest bid
was defective in any way or that it was nonresponsive
to the request for bids. I t is his contention that in spite
of that fact that the lowest bid was $108,888.00 lower
than his, it was his bid that should have been accepted
because the lowest bidder had a competitive advantage.
In every bidding procedure there is undoubtedly a competitive advantage to one bidder or another. Such
things as better buying ability, goods purchased previously at a lower price, etc., may allow one bidder to
bid at a lower price allowing that bidder a competitive
advantage. A contractor may even bid a job at a loss
in order to keep his force employed. A claim cannot in
any event be based upon the fact that a competitor had
an advantage, but only upon whether his bid was the
lowest responsible bid or not. In the case at bar, Appellant does not contend that his bid was the lowest responsible bid and it is for this reason that the Heyer
Products case lends no comfort to the Appellant in this
case.
While the Court in the Heyer Products Co. case
never discussed the problem of consideration for the implied contract, it would be the allegation of this writer
that there was none. As previously discussed, the only
consideration which this writer could possibly find in
the Heyer case, on the part of defendant, was its promise to give fair consideration to the bid submitted by
Heyer. That obligation was placed upon the defendant
by virtue of 41 U.S.C.A. Sec. 152(b), (said Section
26
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has since been repealed and is now covered by 2305 of
Title 10), which required that the award of contracts
be given to the bidder who: "will be the most advantageous to the government." Since the United States was
already obligated by law to consider the bids fairly, it
could not be consideration for the subsequent claimed
implied contract. Doing an act which a party is already
obligated to do cannot constitute consideration for a
promise or an action on the part of the other party.
VanTassell v. Lewis, 118 U. 356, 222 P.2d 350 (1950).

P O I N T IV
T H E GREAT W E I G H T OF A U T H O R I T Y IS
C O N T R A R Y TO HEFER
PRODUCTS
CO.
AND HOLDS T H A T ADVERTISING FOR
A N D R E C E I V I N G B I D S C R E A T E S NO IMP L I E D CONTRACT, A N D T H A T A REJ E C T E D B I D D E R H A S NO S T A N D I N G .
The rules governing bidding for public contracts
are analegeous to the rules governing auction sales.
That is, an ordinary advertisement for bids or tender
is not itself an offer, but the bid or tender is an offer
which creates no rights until accepted. Levinson v. U.S.,
258 U.S. 198, 66 L.Ed. 563, 42 S. Ct. 275 (1972);
U.S. v. Conti, 119 F.2d 652 (1941); Weitz v. Independent Dist., 79 la. 423, 44 N.W. 696 (1890); Cedar
Rapids Lum. Co. v. Fisher, 129 la. 332, 105 N . W . 595
(1906); Cole County v. Central Mo. Tr. Co., 302 Mo.
222, 257 S.W. 774 (1924); Straw v. Williamsport, 286
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Pa. 41, 132 A. 804 (1926); O'Dowd v. Waters, 130
S.C. 232, 125 S.E. 644 (1924); Bromley v. McHugh,
122 Wash. 361, 210 P . 809 (1922); Escote Mfg. Co.
v. U.S., 169 F . Supp. 483 (1959); Beirne v. Alaska
State Housing Authority, 454 P.2d 262 (1969); Universal Const. Co. v. Arizona Console. Masonary, etc.,
93 Ariz. 4, 377 P.2d 1017 (1963); O. C. Kinney, Inc.
v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 151 Colo. 571, 397 P.2d 628
(1963).
Even though the charter of a municipality or a
state statute expressly requires that a contract shall be
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, a contract is
not formed until the lowest bid is in fact accepted.
Farrell v. Bd. of Ed., 10 N . J . Misc. 88, 157 A. 656
(1932); In re. Summitt Hill School Dir's. Removal,
289 Pa. 82, 137 A. 143 (1927); Arthur Venneri Co. v.
Housing Auth. of City of Patterson, 29 N . J . 392, 149
A.2d 228 (1959). Even after acceptance of the bid, no
contract is formed until the requisite formality has been
complied with. Covington v. Basich Bros. Const. Co.,
72 Ariz. 280, 233 P.2d 837 (1951); Berkeley Unified
School Dist. v. James I. Barnes Const. Co., 112 F .
Supp. 396, (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1953); Franklin Snow Co.
v. Commonwealth, 303 Mass. 511, 22 N.E.2d 559
(1939); Wayne Crouse, Inc. v. School Dist. of Braddock, 341 Pa. 497,19 A.2d 843 (1941).
Advertising for bids is nothing more than a solicitation of bids for doing the work and does not itself import any contractual obligation. William A. Berbusse,
Jr., Inc. v.North Broward Hospital Dist., (Fla. App.)
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117 So. 2d 550 (1960); Anderson v. Public Schools,
122 Mo. 61, 27 S.W. 610 (1894). Advertisement is a
mere invitation to enter into a bargain rather than an
offer. O'Keefe v. Lee Calan Imports, Inc., 128 111.
App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 758 (1970). An unsuccessful bidder even if he be the lowest bidder cannot maintain an action at law against the local government for
its failure to grant him a contract. Talbot Paving Co.
V. Detroit, 109 Mich. 647, 67 N.W. 979 (1896). The
lowest bidder cannot maintain an action because invitation to bid is merely solicitation to offer and not an
offer itself. Malen Const. Corp. v. Bd. of County Road
Comm. of Wayne County, 187 F . Supp. 937 (1960).
The courts theorize that bidding and the provisions of
bid statutes are intended for the benefit of the local
government and its taxpayers not for the benefit of
disappointed bidders. General Steel Products Corp. v.
New York City, 187 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1959); Thatcher
Chemical Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra; Malloy
V. New Rochelle, 198 N.Y. 402, 92 N . E . 94 (1910);
Kayfield Construction Corp. v. Morris, 15 A.D.2d 373,
225 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1962); U.S. v. Purcell Envelope
Co., 249 U.S. 313, 63 L.Ed. 620, 39 S.Ct. 300 (1919) ;
Somers Const. Co., Inc. v. Board of Ed. for Southern
Gloucester County Regional High School Dist., 198
F . Supp. 732 (1961). The New York court observed:
"[The petitioner] did not obtain a vested or property interest in the contract merely by reason of
the fact that it submitted the lowest bid." Kayfield Const. Corp. v. Morris, supra, at p. 514.
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The Alabama Court added:
"The provision for letting the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder is for the benefit of the
public and does not confer on a bidder any right
enforceable at law or in equity." Townsend v.
McCall, 262 Ala. 554, 80 So. 2d 262, 265 (1955).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
"The purpose of a system of competitive bidding
tends to improve competition, to guard against
favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud
and corruption in the awarding of municipal
contracts, and secure the best work or supplies at
the lowest price practicable, and such a system is
designed for the benefit of the citizens and taxpayers and the public interest generally'' (Emphasis added) Thatcher Chemical Co. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., supra, at p. 771,
POINT V
A P P E L L A N T I S C H A R G E D W I T H CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF T H E TERMS OF
T H E CONTRACT IT CLAIMS
SHOULD
H A V E B E E N D I S C L O S E D TO A P P E L L A N T
P R I O R TO B I D D I N G .
Appellant's claim is based upon the provisions of
a contract which was public record and open to inspection of any interested person. Respondent, Salt Lake
City, did not attempt to hide any material facts from
Appellant, nor did it take any devious action. Appellant does not allege any irregularities in the contract
nor does he allege that it was improper in any way. His
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sole allegation is that the contents of that contract
should have been disclosed by the City to Appellant.
The Salt Lake City Recorder is required by law to
". . . maintain a record of all contracts, properly indexed, which record shall be open to inspection of all
interested persons." Sec. 10-10-61, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, as amended.
Such record is constructive notice of the contents
of any contract and for that reason the City is not
obliged to disclose information contained therein.

CONCLUSION
Within the facts of the case at hand there could
be no implied contract. The determination of whether
there is an implied contract is a legal matter which the
court based upon the foregoing authorities should find
to the negative. There can be no implied contract because the required formalities of contracting with Salt
Lake City have not been met. This alleged contract
was in excess of $150 and was not approved by the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City nor was it
countersigned by the City Recorder, both defects which
will cause any contract to be void. Further there was no*
consideration given by Salt Lake City to the Appellant
and the contract must fail for want thereof.
Mere solicitation for bids is not an offer and for
this reason no contract can be formed. A contract, in
order to be binding and have any effect and force, must
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have an offer, an acceptance and consideration. The
alleged implied contract lacks two of the three requirements.
If Appellant were allowed to maintain a suit upon
an implied contract he would be allowed to do that which
the Utah Legislature saw fit to prohibit, i.e., to sue for
misrepresentations, which is a tort action and barred by
Governmental immunity.
As the Court stated in Edelman v. FHA,
Supp. 715 (1966), at p. 717:

251 F .

"In spite of the fact, however, that Edelman
claims in his complaint that he has a contract with
the F H A , it is crystal clear that he has no such
contract. The court is not bound by the conclusions of the pleader and will not permit the essential character of the suit to be disguised or distorted by the 'artful drafting of a complaint.'
Actually Edelman is in the position of an 'unsuccessful bidder' and as such he has no standing
to sue."
Even if an implied contract were allowed, it must
follow that such contract could in no way be broad
enough to include the implied promise that the City
would fairly conduct all aspects of the bidding. I t
could only be found that the City impliedly promised
to give fair and honest consideration to plaintiff's bid;
that it would not wantonly disregard it; that if plaintiff's bid were the lowest responsible bid, it would be
accepted. This Salt Lake City did. Plaintiff's bid was
not the lowest bid. In fact, it was $108,888.00 higher
than the bid which was accepted. It follows that Salt
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Lake City did give its fairest consideration to Appellant's bid and rejected it because it was not the lowest responsible bid. Salt Lake City accepted that bid which
was the most advantageous to the government, the taxpayers, and all concerned.
Since there can be no implied contract, this action
is an action in tort which is barred by the governmental
immunity doctrine inasmuch as the Legislature has not
seen fit, under the facts in this case, to waive immunity
under the Governmental Immunity Act. For this reason, it is urged that this Court affirm the decision of the
lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
J A C K L. C R E L L I N
Salt Lake City Attorney
O. W A L L A C E E A R L
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Salt Lake
City Corporation
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APPENDIX
Notice mailed to Contractor's Association

NOTICE TO CONTRACTORS
Sealed proposals will be received at the office of the City Recorder,
Room 200, City and County Building, until 5:00 o'clock P.M., Wednesday,
May 16, 1973 for the work of constructing an In-Flight Kitchen at the Salt
Lake City International Airport, Project No. 19A-52, according to the plans
on file in the City Engineer's office.
Bids will be publicly opened in Room 301, City and County Building at or
about 10:30 A.M. on Thursday, May 17, 1973, by the Board of City Commissioners.
In lieu of submitting proposals to the City Recorder, bidders may present
sealed proposals to the Board of Commissioners at open meeting on said date of
bi d opening prior to the opening of the first bid.
Instruction to bidders, specifications and forms for contract and bond,
together with plans and profiles, when prepared, may be obtained at the
office of the City Engineer, Room 401, City & County Building.
On the outside of envelope, the bidder shall indicate the nature of the bid.
The right is reserved to reject any or all bids.
Bid bonds will be accepted in lieu of certified check.
BY ORDER OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, THIS
DAY

of-April

26th

1973 .

HERMAN J. HOGENSEN
City Recorder

First Publication April 30, 1973
Last Publication May 4, 1973

(MAILED - April 26, 1973)
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N o t i c e p u b l i s h e d i n D e s e r e t News

NOTICI T O CONTRACTORS
of tht offlct of tht City Rtcordtr,
Room 200, City ond County Building,
until
5:00
o'clock
P.M.,
Wtdntsdoy, Moy 16, 1*73, for tht
work of constructing on In-Fllght
Kttchtn at tht Solt Lokt City Intornotlonol
Airport,
Proltct
No.
19A-52, according to tht plont on
flit In tht City Engmttr's offlct.
Bids will bt publicly optntd In
Room 301, City ond County Building at or about 10:30 A . M . on
Thursday, Moy 17, 1973, by tht
Board of City Commissioners.
In lltu of submlfflna proposals
to tht City Rtcordtr, bMdtrs may
prtstnt staltd proposals to tht
Board of Commissioners at optn
mtttlng on sold daft of bid optnIno prior to tht optnlno of tht
first bid.
Instruction to Mddtrs, sptclficattons and forms for contract and
bond, toptthtr wtth plans ond proflits, whtn prtportd, may bt ©b»
talntd at tht offlct of tht City
Englnttr, Room 401, City & County Building.
On tht outsldt of tnvtlopt, tht
bMdtr shall indicate tht naturt of
tht bid.
T h t right Is rtstrvtd to rtltct
any or all bids.
Bid bonds will bt
lltu of ctrttfltd chtck.
B Y O R D E R O F T H E BOARD
O F COMMISSIONERS O F SALT
L A K E CITY, U T A H , THIS 26TH
DAY O F A P R I L , 1973.
H E R M A N J . HOOENSEN

atyr
First Publication April 30,1973
Last PubticotJon Moy 4,1973
(C-74)

MAILED MAY 1 , 1973
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